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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
NO. 95-3252
_______________
FRANCES E. LIVINGSTONE and
JOSEPH A. LIVINGSTONE, her husband,
Appellants
v.
NORTH BELLE VERNON BOROUGH; FAYETTE CITY BOROUGH; WASHINGTON
TOWNSHIP; FRANK E. MONACK, JR., individually and in his capacity as
officer of WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP; OFFICER RAYMOND MOODY, individually
and in his capacity as officer for FAYETTE CITY BOROUGH; OFFICER
DARHL SNYDER, individually and in his capacity as an officer for
NORTH BELLE VERNON BOROUGH
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
D.C. No. 91-00059
_______________
Argued January 25, 1996
Before: COWEN and SAROKIN, Circuit Judges
and POLLAK, District Judge

----------------ORDER AMENDING SLIP OPINION
------------------

It is hereby ordered that the slip opinion in the aboveentitled appeal filed July 31, 1996 be amended in accordance with
the following.
On page 9, the second full paragraph should read:

With this background history as predicate, the court
in Livingstone I then proceeded to review the elements of
proof for a showing of voluntariness, finding that the

parties seeking to enforce the release-dismissal
agreement bore the burden of showing that the
Livingstones' assent was "voluntary, deliberate and
informed." 12 F.3d at 1211. We concluded that the
defendants had not met this burden with the certainty
called for on summary judgment, given that Mrs.
Livingstone was confused as to the terms of the releasedismissal arrangement, that the claimed release-dismissal
agreement was never written down, and that the asserted
agreement -- assuming there was a meeting of the minds -was made, if at all, during a brief and ambiguous oral
colloquy. See id. at 1211-14. Accordingly, we reversed
the grant of summary judgment and directed that the case
be remanded for further proceedings.
On page 16, the first paragraph should read:
The Livingstones also question whether North Belle
Vernon Borough and Fayette City Borough -- which we will
refer to, for brevity, as "the two boroughs" -- had the
same status under the release-dismissal agreement as did
Washington Township. In the voluntariness proceeding in
the district court, counsel for the Livingstones had
requested that a specific question on the verdict form
address the status of the two boroughs under the
agreement. The district court declined to include such
a question on the form, finding that Ceraso's statements
in the colloquy before Judge Cicchetti included all three
municipalities, and that all three therefore had the same
status for purposes of the voluntariness question. In
response to the objections of the Livingstones' counsel
to this ruling, the district court permitted him to argue
to the jury that the ambiguous nature of the agreement
between the Livingstones and the two boroughs rendered
the release-dismissal agreement involuntary as a whole.
App. at 804-06.
The last paragraph on page 45 continuing on to page 46 should
read:
However, we anticipate that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would be very attentive to how the voluntariness of
a release-dismissal agreement is established. Such
judicial attentiveness would be called for both because
of the danger that such agreements will be concluded in
improper circumstances, and because Pennsylvania has a
policy of declining to enforce contracts concluded under
duress or threat of prosecution. See, e.g., Germantown
Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 143 (Pa. Super.
1985) (applying a rule that threats of criminal
prosecution constitute duress rendering a contract
voidable, and stating: "It is an affront to our judicial
sensibilities that one person's ability to seek another's
prosecution can be bartered and sold the same as

commodities in the market place. It is even more
repugnant when the foul stench of oppression pervades the
transaction."). For reasons we have already discussed,
the voluntariness of oral release-dismissal agreements is
especially likely to be problematic, and -- precisely
because such agreements are not evidenced by a writing -determinations of the voluntariness of such agreements
are particularly likely to be unreliable. See supra at
31-36. Accordingly, we predict that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, when faced with the question, will subject
the voluntariness of oral release-dismissal agreements to
a heightened standard of proof, and we therefore conclude
that the voluntariness of the release-dismissal agreement
now before us must be demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Louis H. Pollak
District Judge

Dated:

August 14, 1996

